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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
The Family strikes back 
The decision to sack Yevgeni Primakov and face the Duma's impeachment vote 
head-on is pure Yel'tsin: last-minute resoluteness (or reckless stubbornness) in a 
confrontation, which brings the country to the brink of political chaos. When 
Yel'tsin eventually prevails, as he has done a dumbfounding number of times, he 
then retreats on vacation while his gains are frittered away by Kremlin and 
government apparat ineptitude. 
 
Just how Yel'tsin managed a hat trick last month -- i.e., dislodging Primakov, 
dodging an impeachment charge and winning confirmation of Sergei Stepashin -- 
nearly defies explanation. And yet, as astonishing as Yel'tsin's re-emergence and 
effective reassertion of authority may be, the utter confusion and back-room 
infighting evident in the selection of cabinet ministers represent an exponential 
magnification of the factional rivalries that have marred previous governments. 
 
The fierceness of the personnel combat is necessitated by the scarcity of 
resources at stake. In this incarnation, the government's members seem less 
determined to protect or invigorate economic reforms; this government's raison 
d'etre appears to be to secure access to sufficient funds to influence the 
upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections. That is, assuming elections 
will actually be held. Speculation is rampant over the possibility of canceling the 
elections, and it is with great pessimism I note that it now seems anything could 
happen in Russia this year. 
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For the record, following are the more contentious of the government 
appointments to date: 
 
Sergei Stepashin -- Prime Minister 
Nikolai Aksenenko -- First Deputy Prime Minister 
Viktor Khristenko -- First Deputy Prime Minister 
 
Valentina Matvienko -- Deputy Prime Minister (social policy) 
Vladimir Shcherbak -- Deputy Prime Minister (agriculture) 
Ilya Klebanov Deputy -- Prime Minister (military policy) 
Vladimir Rushailo -- Interior Minister 
Mikhail Kasayanov -- Finance Minister 
Leonid Drachevsky -- CIS Affairs 
Vyacheslav Mikhailov -- Nationalities Minister 
Mikhail Fradkov -- Trade Minister 
Viktor Orlov -- Natural Resources 
Alex Pochinok -- Tax Collection 
Farit Gazizullin -- Privatization 
Viktor Kalyuzhny -- Fuel and Energy Minister 
Ilya Yuzhanov -- Anti-monopoly 
 
Andrei Chernenko will head up the government apparatus. 
 
(MOSKOVSKY KOMSOMOLETS, 26 May 99; Agency WPS/nexis, and RUSSIA 
TODAY FEATURES, 1 Jun 99; www.russiatoday.com) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Chandler Rosenberger and Sarah Miller 
 
Done deal, or deal undone? 
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As NATO's air campaign against Serbia moved into its third month, the US 
administration and NATO spokesmen insisted that the alliance remained firmly 
united behind its military and political objectives. The administration, however, 
having turned over much of the negotiating process to the Russians, enabled 
Moscow to use the Balkan crisis for its own, quite distinct, ends. The peace deal 
touted at the end of May had fewer contradictions than the proposal put forward 
at the beginning of the month, but it fell far short of the aims the administration 
had touted as worth fighting for. Russia, meanwhile, emerged from the confusion 
strengthened. 
 
The fog of peace 
In early May the Clinton administration turned to the G-7, a body not previously 
known for its diplomatic role, as the multinational instrument through which to 
boost its Kosovo peace plan. The body was perhaps a natural choice, given that 
it includes only those NATO members most resolute in pursuit of the White 
House's aims and is a regular host of Russia, the country through which the 
administration hoped to reach Belgrade. Even a good bottle, however, cannot 
disguise a bad wine, and the ambiguities of the G-7's plan left a bad taste in all 
the parties' mouths. 
 
The proposal, for example, insisted that "international civil and security 
presences" protect returning Kosovar Albanian refugees, but did not specify 
whether this meant a heavily armed NATO force, as the White House demanded, 
or peace keepers drawn from neutral countries under the United Nations' 
command, as Russia preferred. Under the plan, the Kosovo Liberation Army was 
to disarm -- a demand the KLA leadership had already rejected. Even the 
eventual legal status of Kosovo was described in utterly contradictory terms. Rule 
over Kosovo, the plan said, would be determined while "taking full account of the 
Rambouillet Accords and principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." Since the Rambouillet Accords had included a 
referendum on Kosovo's legal status, and since such a referendum would have 
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almost certainly produced a declaration of the province's independence, the G-7 
plan was either insubstantial or insincere -- or both. (THE OTTAWA CITIZEN, 7 
May 99; nexis) 
 
Safe European home 
The Clinton administration, however, not only put forward a bad plan: The US 
asked the Russians to implement it. Moscow promptly exploited the proposal's 
internal contradictions to its own advantage. Russian Prime Minister Yevgeni 
Primakov may not have survived Boris Yel'tsin's latest return to the world stage, 
but Primakov's assertive foreign policy suddenly suited Yel'tsin more than ever. 
Under the direction of longtime Primakov protege Igor Ivanov, the Russian 
foreign ministry picked at the very Western alliance on whose behalf it was 
supposedly acting. 
 
Ivanov, for example, continued Primakov's long-term strategy of cultivating 
relationships with NATO's continental members under the rubric of the common 
European home that they and Russia share. He first had French President 
Jacques Chirac endorse a bilateral French-Russia working group on the Balkans, 
the appointment of Finnish President Marti Ahtisaari as the UN's international 
mediator, and the positioning of the UN as final arbiter of peace. (RUSSIA TV, 
1600 GMT, 13 May 99; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts/nexis) Invited to a 
meeting of European Union foreign ministers, Ivanov then met separately with 
Greek Foreign Minister Yeoryios Papandreou and later promoted a Greek plan 
for a cease-fire. (NET TV, 1500 GMT, 17 May 99; BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts/nexis) 
 
In his own presentation to the EU meeting, Ivanov outlined a vision of European 
security under which Russia and the EU would cooperate during crises. Later, 
Russian ambassador to the EU Vassily Likachev explained that Moscow and 
Brussels needed to work especially closely when "the different poles of this 
multipolar world behave differently." (EUROPE REPORT, 22 May 99; nexis) 
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In his continual demands that NATO halt its bombing campaign, Ivanov put the 
blame for upsetting a European peace on the alliance's military commanders and 
hinted that the United States' role in European security would have to be 
dramatically reduced. NATO's relations with Russia, Ivanov said, "could never be 
the same as they were before March 24," the day the bombing began. (AGENCE 
FRANCE-PRESSE, 1042 GMT, 25 May 99; nexis) Later, Ivanov suggested 
alternatives to the alliance -- organizations of which Russia is a member and in 
which the United States has a minor role. "The Council of Europe has every 
chance of becoming a foundation of the European architecture, similar to the 
OSCE," Ivanov declared. "This is particularly important given the lessons of the 
ongoing Balkan crisis." (INTERFAX RUSSIAN NEWS, 26 May 99; nexis) 
 
The Indispensable Nation 
Despite Moscow's hostility both towards the NATO alliance and the bombing 
campaign it was pursuing, the Clinton administration leaned on Russian 
diplomacy. In fact, the White House depended so heavily on Moscow's supposed 
"special relationship" with Belgrade that Russia was able to hold the entire 
negotiating process hostage. 
 
Whether Russia actually has deep historical ties to the Serbs is debatable. (See 
Rosenberger, Chandler, "Russia's 'Little Slav Brother'?" in PERSPECTIVE, 
March-April 99) The historical legitimacy of the supposed relationship became 
irrelevant as the White House propounded the theory and the Russians gladly 
accepted their enhanced prestige. Moscow's influence grew so great that on 21 
May United States Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbot found himself negotiating with 
two Russian partners, first meeting with special envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin and 
UN representative Ahtisaari, then holding separate talks with Ivanov. 
 
Russia thus appeared above a conflict in which the United States was merely 
one of the combatants. As the peace mediator, Russia expected its wishes to be 
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respected, envoy Chernomyrdin said. If not, "Russia will simply withdraw from 
this process," he told Russian TV. "This is not our war. We did not start it." 
(RUSSIA TV, 2046 GMT, 24 May 99; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts/nexis) 
 
Faced with such threats, Talbot watered down the United States' position. The 
White House no longer demanded that all Serb troops remove themselves 
permanently from Kosovo. If "Belgrade completes the withdrawal of troops [from 
Kosovo]," Talbot said, "the international community may stop and think about 
how to let some Belgrade officials come back to the region." Nor was the United 
States still insisting that the Rambouillet Accords form the basis of peace. The 
US and Russia agreed, Talbot said, that Kosovo must remain within Serbia. Talk 
of a referendum that might end in Kosovo's sovereignty was dropped. This was a 
relief, perhaps, to those who had found the contradictions in the US policy 
troubling. It threw into question, however, why the US had insisted on war in the 
first place. (INTERFAX RUSSIAN NEWS, 26 May 99; nexis) 
 
Collateral damage 
However much destruction NATO had wreaked on Serbia and its military in May, 
the Clinton administration's questionable diplomacy harmed US interests in 
Europe to an even greater degree. The administration may yet choose to ignore 
the peace plan that it negotiated through Russia's good offices, and fight on the 
ground for the principles that launched its campaign from the sky. Washington, 
however, has managed to squander diplomatic control over its own military 
campaign. To use the language with which it once blurred moral distinctions in 
Bosnia, the United States is now merely one of the "warring parties." 
 
Are you with us? 
Russian efforts to build better relations with China may be succeeding. Lately, 
Russia and China have been seeing eye to eye on many global issues, including 
Kosovo. Indeed, both have demanded that NATO stop the bombing in 
Yugoslavia before the G-8 peace proposal can be taken to the UN Security 
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Council. However, before NATO could be persuaded, it bombed the Chinese 
embassy in Belgrade. In response, China has threatened to prevent a UN 
Security Council resolution to adopt the G-8 plan. (Jamestown Foundation 
MONITOR, 12 May 99) In the wake of the Chinese embassy bombing, Russian 
Presidential Envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin traveled to Beijing to meet with Chinese 
President Jiang Zemin and Prime Minister Zhu Rongji to address the delicate 
matter. Russia has an interest in maintaining its relationship with China as well 
as in ending the Kosovo crisis. According to Chernomyrdin, his trip to Beijing 
focused on gaining Chinese support for the peace plan in the Security Council. 
Although the Chinese gave no indication of their decision after the meeting, the 
trip indicates Russia's commitment to a peaceful, diplomatic end to the conflict, 
especially if Russia's efforts look successful at NATO's expense. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Michael Thurman 
 
FEDERAL ASSEMBLY 
A busy couple of weeks for the Duma 
Prime Minister Primakov was dismissed and his first deputy, Sergei Stepashin, 
was nominated to fill his position. This came just before the Duma debate on 
removing Yel'tsin on five articles of impeachment, the most serious of which was 
complicity in the bloody war in Chechnya. Some thought that the sacking of the 
popular prime minister would push enough legislators into the anti-Yel'tsin camp 
to pass one or more of the articles. This did not happen. The Duma then 
confirmed Stepashin's nomination for prime minister. 
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Two important questions can be asked in light of these recent events: Has 
Yel'tsin won at the Duma's expense, and what will a Stepashin prime 
ministership mean for the upcoming Duma elections? 
 
It had become quite common to claim that Primakov was the real power in 
Moscow, with help from his Communist allies in the Duma. Yel'tsin was cast as a 
waning monarch who had become a national embarrassment. However, such 
assessments neglected to take into account the fact that the prime minister, no 
matter how powerful, serves at the pleasure of the president. The Duma, or more 
accurately the anti-Yel'tsin camp of deputies, lost in two ways: without the 
patronage of a prime minister like Primakov (Stepashin is loyal to the president), 
the Duma will be increasingly marginalized; and by voting for Stepashin, it has 
shown it cannot stand up to the president in the run-up to the elections in the fall. 
Not much more should be expected from this Duma. 
 
However, the Duma's return to the margins of Russian political power is not so 
surprising: It is accustomed to being there. What is new, and will have a 
potentially far greater impact on the future of the federation, is the person of the 
prime minister. In an interview given just after his appointment as first deputy 
prime minister, Stepashin spoke of Yel'tsin's motives: "The president explained 
his decision in a conversation with me by the fact that there was a need to 
increase the work with the regions. This includes using the potential of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs -- I think you understand what I mean by that. 
Secondly, there also is much work to be done in connection with the upcoming 
elections. The point is to stop criminal elements from getting to power whether in 
the executive branch or the legislative branch. In this sense, a first deputy 
premier who simultaneously is the minister of internal affairs and looks after 
regional policy and other areas of policy has a fairly major role to play." (NTV, 
1700 GMT, 2 May 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0502) 
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With political parties and movements proliferating all over the place, and with the 
regions feeling their oats, Yel'tsin could easily be concerned that he may not be 
able to influence significantly the elections to the Duma in December and to the 
presidency a year after that. A prime minister with ready access to the troops of 
the state police, and one who is not afraid to use them, may be in a better 
position to push and prod at the edges of the electoral process to obtain a 
favorable outcome. 
 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
All-Russia movement plans to cooperate with new government 
The most recent, and potentially the most viable political movement, All-Russia, 
has announced it will cooperate with the new government of Sergei Stepashin. 
All-Russia was formed to represent the interests of the regions and it actively 
solicits support from the country's governors. Although it is not a party, the 
movement could influence the coming elections by allying itself with a party 
which has registered to run. 
 
Mintimir Shaimiev, the president of Tatarstan, claimed that the movement would 
seek to win a majority in the Duma in the upcoming elections, thereby 
ideologically linking the Federation Council and the Duma. (INTERFAX NEWS 
AGENCY, 22 May 99; nexis) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By CDR Fred Drummond 
 
Is there a doctrine in the house? 
Months before Operation Allied Force unleashed NATO's airpower against 
Serbia, there were numerous calls within Russia to reform the country's military 
doctrine. The conflict in the Balkans brought a new wave of criticism of the 
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existing doctrine, and new statements from Russian officials that military doctrine 
and security issues need to be revised. 
 
Background: 
In 1993 the document "Main Provisions of the Russian Federation Military 
Doctrine" was published. This was significant for two reasons. First, the Soviet 
Union never published a single source official military doctrine. Westerners were 
able to piece together what in effect was the Soviet doctrine only through careful 
analysis of Russian military writings in various journals and publications. Second, 
the publication of the doctrine in 1993 gave the West insight into the emerging 
Russian Federation's military direction. Looking back at the document with recent 
statements in mind, questions arise as to what part of the doctrine is seen to be 
needing revision. Some of the stated political foundations of the doctrine 
represented quite a departure from the Soviet era. Acknowledging the end of the 
Cold War with the statement of "overcoming of the confrontation brought about 
by the ideological standoff," the new doctrine stated plainly that the Russian 
Federation "does not treat any of the states as an adversary." Nuclear weapons 
were a key deterrent force, but Russia would work to reduce nuclear forces to a 
minimum and support stopping nuclear weapons testing. The primary sources of 
potential conflict were seen as nationalist and religious wars and conflicts, with 
those that were in the "immediate vicinity" of the Russian borders posing threats 
to the Federation. (MILITARY THOUGHT, special issue November 93, pp. 2-3) 
 
The basic doctrine was modified in the following years, but those key concepts 
remained. Now, alarmed by NATO's (and, by implication, US) intervention within 
the internationally recognized borders of a sovereign country, Moscow may be 
working on a doctrinal revision. Defense Minister Igor Sergeev said that he 
received instructions from the president of the Russian Federation on this issue, 
but gave no details. (ITAR-TASS, 0736 GMT, 14 May 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0514) 
It's one thing when reading sentiments of this nature in Rossiyskaya gazeta, 
Komsomol'skaya gazeta, or (especially) Sovetskaya Rossiya, but Sergeev's 
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comments elevate the revision calls to a higher, more serious level. Unfortunately 
for the Russian officials, though, there is a critical gap between words in a 
document and the military and economic power to back up a more aggressive 
stance. Interestingly, Tass released two more press releases quoting Sergeev 
saying the same thing on 14 and 25 May, apparently in the belief that repeating 
anything often enough will make it so. 
 
There were other similar, and familiar, press reports during May. In an address 
prepared for a military parade in Moscow, ITAR-TASS pulled out Sergeev's 
comments on the strength of Russia's nuclear forces and made a short release of 
that; ten days later a "leading Russian foreign policy analyst" called for a policy of 
"early use of nuclear weapons at the first sign of a threat." (ITAR-TASS, 1214 
GMT, 7 May 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0507 and BNS, 1534 GMT, 17 May 99; FBIS-
SOV-1999-0517) Combined with the many published critiques of NATO's policies 
and actions, a change in doctrine seems inevitable. But is it really? The major US 
newspapers pretty much ignored these statements, as did the US government, at 
least publicly. Perhaps the West is taking most of these outwardly belligerent 
statements for what they are, examples of Russian frustration at the 
marginalization of Russia's influence on the world stage. The West, as well as 
the Russians, know that no real change in Russia's military direction can take 
place in the current economic situation. As a reminder of that, let's look at some 
other news items. In the meantime, if Russia succeeds in finding a diplomatic 
solution to the Kosovo crisis, perhaps that will be enough to restore some 
Russian pride and reduce the calls for revising its military doctrine. 
 
Let's party 
Tass reported on drug addiction and alcoholism in the Russian military in late 
May. The information came from members of the Main Military Prosecutor's 
Office. Its director stated that part of the problem is that the makeup of the armed 
forces reflects that of society at large; he also noted that the US experienced 
similar problems but solved them through an integrated effort to combat narcotics 
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distribution. (ITAR-TASS, 0947 GMT, 20 May 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0520) It was 
unclear if the director was referring to US military counter-drug efforts or the 
general war on drugs conducted by civilian authorities throughout the land. It is 
true that in the 1970s the US armed forces, with the significant players probably 
being the Army and the Navy, experienced serious drug abuse problems within 
the ranks. After rigorous programs were instituted, including mandatory random 
drug screenings which continue to this day, the US reduced illegal drug use to a 
very low level. So, with the right approach, and resources, such problems are not 
insurmountable. 
 
On a lighter note, the Russian Pacific Fleet had two birthday parties this year, 
sort of. Turns out that the 21 April celebration of the fleet's 67th anniversary was 
off by a month and a few years, as historians determined that the Russian senate 
actually established the Okhotsk port and military flotilla on 21 May 1731. The 
party celebrating the 268th anniversary must have been a blast: The officers 
were to be entertained by the historians who discovered the "historic truth." 
(ITAR-TASS, 0040 GMT, 21 May 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0521) No word on what 
refreshments may have been served. 
 
There isn't much to celebrate about the Russian air force these days, based on 
an Interfax report. (INTERFAX, 0706 GMT, 22 May 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0522) 
The short release starts out on a deceptive note, stating that "over one billion 
rubles" were saved by the merger of the Air Force (VVS) and the Air Defense 
Troops (VPVO) into one service. More than 44,000 personnel were retired, all 
with pay, which is indeed good news. Then comes the rest of the story. Training 
flights were cut in half, so that pilots now get 50 hours of flight time per year. 
Training flights for "graduates of Air Force schools were slashed to 100 hours, 
while the norm is 250 hours." To put those hours in perspective, US military 
tactical (i.e., fighter-type) pilots log about 20-25 hours each month on a normal 
basis, excluding operations in the Balkans and Iraq. USN student pilots undergo 
250-275 hours of training before receiving their wings. USAF pilot training is 
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similar in length. Just as telling as to the state of the Russian air force were 
aircraft acquisitions: The service received 77 aircraft in 1992; 66 in '93; 29 in '94; 
31 in '95; 19 in '96; 6 in '97; and zero in 1998. 
 
This column will go on hiatus until August, when the 1999-2000 military fellows 
will resume covering the Russian armed forces. Inbound are Lt Col Jill Skelton, 
USAF, and LCDR James Duke, USN. CDR Drummond will be joining the staff of 
Commander Carrier Group Four in mid-June. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: CIS 
By Sarah Miller 
 
Defense ministers meet in Yerevan 
On 20 May, the CIS defense ministers held their first session since the CIS 
Collective Security Treaty withdrawals and GUUAM enlargement last month. 
Although the Russian government has stressed that withdrawal from the 
Collective Security Treaty does not affect CIS membership, the attendance roster 
in Yerevan suggests that GUUAM members do intend to limit their involvement, 
at least in military-related CIS affairs. Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan opted 
not to attend, while Moldova and Ukraine, as well as non-GUUAM members 
Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, sent only representatives. In contrast, Armenia, 
Russia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan -- all of which are members of the 
Collective Security Treaty and traditionally pro-Russian on CIS matters -- sent 
their defense ministers. Prior to the meeting, the Armenian and Belarusian 
ministers took the opportunity to sign a military bilateral agreement which "lays 
the legal foundations for military cooperation between Yerevan and Minsk," 
according to the Belarusian minister. (INTERFAX, 0814 GMT, 20 May 99; FBIS-
SOV-1999-0520) The session addressed many issues of CIS military 
cooperation, including coordination efforts, Collective Security implementation, 
and a CIS air defense system. (ITAR-TASS, 1240 GMT, 20 May 99; FBIS-SOV-
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1999-0520) In effect, the meeting highlighted the increasing polarization of the 
CIS in the past month between the "Russian 6" (the five ministerial Yerevan 
attendees plus Tajikistan) and GUUAM. The venue alone -- Yerevan, instead of a 
more neutral capital -- did little to make non-Collective Security members feel 
welcomed at the session. 
 
In with the new... 
New CIS Executive Chairman Yuri Yarov met with new Russian Prime Minister 
Sergei Stepashin in Moscow on 22 May to discuss CIS reorganization efforts in 
preparation for the 4 June CIS Heads of State summit. (INTERFAX, 0650 GMT, 
22 May 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0522) The two met after Yarov's first round of CIS-
wide shuttle diplomacy. Yarov has indicated that his foremost concerns are 
implementation of a CIS single economic zone and downsizing of the CIS 
executive structure, both of which were discussed at the last CIS Heads of State 
summit. (See The NIS Observed, 26 April 99) Thus far, Yarov has failed to 
persuade several CIS members that a single economic zone is in their interest, 
especially since membership could conflict with possible membership in other 
non-CIS economic organizations such as the World Trade Organization. 
According to Turkmen President Saparmurad Niyazov, joining the CIS free trade 
zone is unfeasible since there is no way of assuring an "equal and mutually 
advantageous partnership." (INTERFAX, 1122 GMT, 14 May 99; FBIS-SOV-
1999-0514) In fact, only 6 out of 12 CIS members have signed the 1994 
agreement, which was scheduled to become effective on 1 January 1999. 
(SNARK, 1530 GMT, 19 May 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0520) 
 
Meanwhile, GUAM has taken steps to realize a new economic partnership with 
Poland that would pipe oil along a proposed Baku-Gdansk line. The plan has 
been discussed at several bilateral meetings between Ukraine, Poland and 
Azerbaijan. Ukraine has taken the initiative to develop relations with both 
countries and has nearly completed its end of the deal, a large-capacity oil 
terminal outside of Odessa. (Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 18 May 99) If 
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the pipeline does open, it will provide an alternative route for oil that cannot be 
pumped through the unfinished Baku-Ceyhan line while providing another new 
economic partnership with Poland, a NATO nation. In light of Azeri, Georgian, 
and Ukrainian interest in NATO programs and eventual membership, these 
economic inroads could prove helpful in the future. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
Much ado about not much; No ado about everything else 
Police in Simferopol are searching for the individual(s) who set off an explosive 
device near Communist Party headquarters during the Crimean Tatar 
demonstration commemorating their expulsion in 1944. The explosive device 
was reportedly planted in the vicinity of a tent city erected by the demonstrators 
in Lenin Square. 
 
From the amount of attention given the event by the news media, one would 
assume that the explosion caused major damage, or at least substantial injuries. 
The media explained that the explosion "shook the building of Ukraine's 
Communist Party" (UKRAINIAN TV THIRD PROGRAMME, 1500 GMT, 20 May 
99; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts/nexis) and "... a missile exploded in the 
air ... in the vicinity of the tent city." Russia's NTV reported that "last night's 
explosion may shutter [sic] the fragile stability that the authorities have managed 
to achieve in the republic." (NTV, 0400 GMT, 23 May 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0523) 
 
However, there were, in fact, no injuries, and the only damage now appears to 
have been a few broken windows in the Communist headquarters building. 
Meanwhile, the deputy chairman of the unrecognized Tatar Assembly denied that 
demonstrators had been involved in the incident. Remzi Ablaev blamed "certain 
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forces" for trying to "drive a wedge between the Crimean Tatars and other 
members of Crimean society." (ITAR-TASS WORLD SERVICE, 1245 GMT, 23 
May 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0523) 
 
The apparent outrage over this incident contrasts sharply with the almost 
complete lack of attention given to the significant rise of violence against Tatars. 
As reported in The NIS Observed of 10 May, several mosques were recently 
destroyed in suspicious fires, graveyards were seriously damaged and a 
monument to those who died during deportation in 1944 was vandalized. The 
negative attention also overlooked the general peacefulness of the protest. 
Although the Tatars held a week of demonstrations in at least six major Crimean 
cities, culminating in 40,000 people converging on Lenin Square on 18 May, 
there was no violence reported until the explosion. Despite this fact, and despite 
the massive numbers of protesters, there was minimal press coverage of events 
commemorating the deportations. 
 
In contrast, the "First Congress of Ukrainian Russians," held in Kyiv on 22 May, 
garnered significant attention by both the media and the government. President 
Leonid Kuchma sent a message of greeting to the participants. That greeting 
read, in part, "Our state shows constant concern for ensuring the constitutional 
rights and vital needs of those Russians for whom Ukraine has become home 
and promotes the preservation of their ethnic, linguistic and cultural 
distinctiveness." (ITAR-TASS WORLD SERVICE, 0739 GMT, 22 May 99; FBIS-
SOV-1999-0522) Unfortunately, no such greeting was sent to the Tatars, and 
none is expected any time soon. 
 
Everybody smile and say, 'Decree!' 
Question: How many decrees does it take to make a re-elected president? 
Answer: As many as Leonid Kuchma can sign by 31 October. 
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Just days after the official start of the presidential campaign, and armed with a 
suggestion by the IMF that the organization may grant Ukraine an additional 
$350 million this year if progress is made on reforms, President Leonid Kuchma 
has begun a new decree spree. 
 
In mid-May, Kuchma announced that, on 1 June, he would introduce at least six 
new decrees and over a dozen other presidential "measures" dealing with 
everything from banking to tariffs to licensing of businesses to tax breaks to 
privatization tenders to repayment of wages. The measures include detailed sell-
offs of hundreds of state companies and at least 20 land sites. (INTELNEWS, 
0600 GMT, 18 May 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0518) 
 
The decree spree was highlighted by Kuchma in Lvov at a conference of 
executives from Western companies. At the conference, Kuchma seemed 
confident of an election victory. "Ukraine's policy will remain balanced, 
consecutive and there will be no throwback," he said. "I am sure that the future 
presidential election will bring no surprise." His decrees will "make life easier" for 
foreign investors, he said. (REUTERS, 24 May 99; Russia 
Today) 
 
In spite of the support given Kuchma's actions by the IMF, many of the 
announced decrees and measures seem impractical in today's political 
environment, while others seem to be simple election pandering. 
 
For example, although Kuchma announced on 17 May that the large number of 
state companies protected from privatization because of "strategic importance" 
would be "reduced within one month," on 21 May, his cabinet of ministers added 
70 new companies to that list. 
 
In addition, Kuchma announced many "draft laws" to be submitted to parliament 
that stand little chance of passage. His privatization and tax decrees also will 
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undoubtedly encounter trouble in the parliament. Past Kuchma privatization and 
tax decrees have become the subject of a power struggle between the 
presidential administration and the parliament. In fact, the parliament voted on 14 
May to halt the privatization of a large aluminum plant; a privatization that had 
been sought and approved by the Kuchma administration under a 1993 decree. 
(REUTERS, 14 May 99; Russia Today) In a frightening commentary on the state 
of Ukrainian politics, it is unclear whether the parliament's vote to halt this 
privatization is binding, since the chain of command in Ukraine has become so 
confused. Do Kuchma's decrees overrule the votes of the parliament, or is it the 
other way around? No one -- not Kuchma nor the members of parliament -- seem 
to be able to provide that answer. In this environment, Kuchma's decrees have 
occasionally been effective, but often not. Nevertheless, Kuchma's 
announcement garnered support from the Western companies represented in 
Lvov. Perhaps Western investors understand that in Ukraine, "occasionally 
effective" is better than not at all. 
 
BELARUS 
And the winner is ... a secret 
Like fireworks that fizzle before being shot into the sky, the Belarusian 
opposition-sponsored presidential election has ended with a pop rather than an 
explosion. After 10 days of voting conducted in "mobile polling stations" erected 
by the opposition, the alternative presidential election produced only one clear 
winner ... Alyaksandr Lukashenka's dictatorial policies.  
 
On 19 May, Viktor Hanchar, chairman of the Central Election Committee, quietly 
declared the results of the election to be invalid, without announcing which 
candidate had received the most votes. Just two days earlier, Hanchar had 
announced himself satisfied with the voting, saying that voter turnout had been 
over 50%, and therefore, the election results would be valid. (BELAPAN, 1330 
GMT, 17 May 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0517) "The turnout itself demonstrates a 
rejection of the regime by the population," he said. He believed the election 
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would have "serious" international consequences, and that it would give a 
"powerful impetus to governmental and international organizations," ensuring "a 
different attitude by the OSCE and other international organizations." 
 
These statements turned out to be wishful thinking, however. By 17 May, police 
had arrested over 100 opposition vote-takers and were holding one of the two 
opposition candidates, Mikhail Chygir, in jail indefinitely, while the OSCE had 
arrived to announce that the election was important to democratic principles, but 
that it would not "meet the OSCE's standards." (BELAPAN, 1210 GMT, 18 May 
99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0518) At the same time, there was palpable silence from 
many international organizations, and few countries expressed more than 
passive support for the activities of the opposition.  
 
Perhaps most importantly, when Hanchar made his statements of success, the 
votes had not been counted. It can be inferred from his statements during the 
press conference that Alyaksandr Lukashenka received the highest number of 
votes. "... [S]ince the state bodies of power have barred citizens from electing a 
president freely and have denied them a right to discuss the candidate's election 
programs comprehensively and freely, the election outcome has been declared 
invalid," he said. (INTERFAX, 1525 GMT, 19 May 99; BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts/nexis) 
 
The election was also undermined by the sudden and questionable withdrawal of 
Zenon Poznyak, the candidate representing the Popular Front. Poznyak withdrew 
his name from consideration just days before the close of voting because of 
"irregularities." 
 
Within days of Hanchar's announcement invalidating the election results, the 
European Union and the United States released statements praising the efforts 
of the opposition. The statements called on Lukashenka to begin negotiations 
with opposition representatives. (EUROPEAN NEWS SERVICE, 22 May 99; 
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nexis, and US Department of State, 20 May 99; 
www.secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/statements) Meanwhile, Hanchar has 
vowed to hold another election "with new candidates" in three months. 
(REUTERS, 20 May 99; Russia Today) Perhaps this time the fireworks will at 
least get off the ground. 
 
MOLDOVA 
Same ole, same ole 
Moldova's government structure will remain unchanged, after the failure of a 
referendum that would have increased dramatically the powers of President 
Petru Lucinschi. Although 60 percent of those casting ballots approved the 
measure, voter turnout was only 56 percent. According to Moldova's constitution, 
turnout needed to be 60 percent for the referendum to be valid. (REUTERS, 25 
May 99; Russia Today) 
 
The failure of the referendum leaves Moldova with perhaps the most powerful 
parliament among all CIS states, and the least powerful president. Moldova's 
constitution dictates that the cabinet be formed from a specific formula based on 
parliamentary majority. The lack of a majority in the last election resulted in 
fragile coalitions and two changes of government in the last several months. The 
president also has minimal decree powers, a fact which has often left the 
government paralyzed in a struggle between the leftist parliament and centrist 
president. Lucinschi has not stated whether he will hold another referendum on 
the same issue in the future. 
 
During the same election, voters cast ballots in regional elections. Results in 
seven of the nine regions have so far been declared valid. Under 20 percent of 
the residents of Chisinau voted, however, making a second election necessary. It 
is widely expected that incumbent Mayor Serafim Urecheanu will eventually be 
declared the winner. (ITAR-TASS WORLD SERVICE, 1605 GMT, 23 May 99; 
FBIS-SOV-1999-0523) 
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Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
ARMENIA 
Unity bloc takes the lead 
The Unity bloc, headed by the last pre-independence Armenian leader, Karen 
Demirchian, and the current defense minister, Vazgen Sargsian, became the 
largest party in parliament following the 30 May elections. The Unity party won 40 
percent of the vote; the Communist Party came in second with 12.5 percent. 
(REUTERS, 2 Jun 99; nexis) Despite errors in the voting rolls and some reports 
of ballot tampering, the Central Electoral Commission approved the results 
immediately. The first group of European observers to publicize an appraisal of 
the poll, the European Institute for the Media (EIM), described the journalistic 
coverage of the campaign as "neutral and objective." The Armenian media rated 
"okay" in relation to European standards and "good" in comparison with other 
post-Soviet states. (SNARK, 1300 GMT, 31 May 99; BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring/nexis) 
 
Under Armenian law, Vano Siradegian's parliament seat extends his immunity 
from prosecution. Siradegian, who has been accused of ordering contract killings 
while he served as interior minister in Levon Ter-Petrosian's government, has not 
been prosecuted fully due to his immunity as the leader of the Armenian Pan-
National Movement and his status as an electoral candidate. 
 
Echoes of Kosovo 
The leaders of the Caucasian states did not wait for a resolution for an end to the 
bombing of Serbia to draw lessons from the conflict. While in Washington for the 
NATO summit, Armenia's foreign minister drew parallels between Armenia's 
support for Nagorno-Karabakh and NATO's support of the Kosovar Albanians. 
"By using our own forces, we created a security buffer. What NATO is trying to 
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achieve today in Kosovo is what Armenians did in Nagorno-Karabakh. We did 
NATO's job at the time." (WASHINGTON POST, 28 Apr 99; nexis) This 
statement provoked biting criticism in Yerevan where the prevailing mood favors 
Russia and Serbia and regards Turkey and the Albanians with hostility. "Both 
Serbs and Armenians, not only the Karabakh Armenians, defended their 
motherland(!) respectively from Albanian-Muslim and Turkic expansion." 
(GOLOS ARMENII, 5 May 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0507) 
 
President Heydar Aliev of Azerbaijan offered a different view: "[T]he territorial 
integrity of every nation should be inviolable. We are against separatism." 
(WASHINGTON POST, 28 Apr 99; nexis) Although the Azerbaijani government 
seeks membership in NATO, and has taken every opportunity to show goodwill 
to the West (even volunteering to send personnel to Kosovo at the outset of the 
crisis), Aliev fears the precedent that the Kosovo crisis may set. On what grounds 
can NATO members continue to insist on a restoration of Azerbaijan's 
sovereignty over all of its territory if they preside over the partition of Serbia? 
 
AZERBAIJAN 
What price oil as deadline for the Ceyhan pipeline approaches? 
Construction of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline could start in the next three months, 
Heydar Aliev announced in late May. Ankara echoed this optimistic assessment 
when the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources offered the terms of a 
commercial proposal to Azerbaijan. Citing the 13 April Istanbul Declaration, 
Ankara stressed its commitment to finalizing three key agreements in early June. 
(ANATOLIA, 0938 GMT, 27 May 99; BBC Worldwide Monitoring/nexis) 
 
The construction of the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline has been repeatedly postponed 
because neither the governments nor the companies concerned have come up 
with the necessary funds. The dramatic decline in the price of oil in 1998 and 
early 1999 to the nadir since the 1950s represented particularly bad luck for 
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Azerbaijan and Turkey because it has discouraged the consortium member 
companies from making the necessary investments. 
 
The cost of building the pipeline, estimates of which vary between $2.5 billion 
and $4 billion, will be easier to meet now that the price of oil has rebounded. 
Since the end of 1998 it has gone up 60 percent from about $10 to $16 per barrel 
and some experts predict an increase to as much as $20 or $21. (BUFFALO 
NEWS, 25 May 99; nexis) Under such conditions the pipeline to Ceyhan may 
turn out to be much more profitable than previously expected.  
 
Recent events reveal another advantage of the Ceyhan route: its independence 
from Russia and the Persian Gulf. As oil prices began to show a recovery in 
March, several of the major oil producers, including OPEC, Russia, and Mexico, 
announced they would reduce the amount they supply in an effort to drive prices 
even higher. As an oil-importing state, the US would benefit if a new independent 
oil producer entered the market. 
 
Russian journal exhibits rare candor 
In its March 1999 issue, the journal Vlast (Power), which draws its audience from 
the presidential administration, the government, and the Federal Assembly, ran 
the article "Caspian Oil and Russian Security," by Artem Mal'gin, an instructor of 
International Relations at the Moscow State Institute for International Relations 
(MGIMO), which falls under the foreign ministry.  
 
Mal'gin argues that American interests require that the US pursue non-OPEC 
sources of oil, while Russia stands to benefit from "limiting the number of 'sellers' 
on the energy market, which would allow them to agree upon and maintain the 
necessary price level. The appearance of new independent or US-dependent 
market participants is disadvantageous for Russia."  
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Some may note that the oil producers have failed to collude successfully to set 
the price on numerous recent occasions and that the volume of oil from the 
Caspian would not come in sufficiently large quantity to alter the market price. 
Still, the political implications of his argument are clear: Russian interests are 
served best if Caspian oil remains in the ground. But if it must reach the market, 
it should go through Russian pipelines.  
 
How will Russia pursue this objective? This "became evident in January-
February of this year and in the first place concerns the Baku-Ceyhan route. On 
the eve of the adoption of the final decision regarding the route of the main artery 
for Caspian oil, Armenia tapped into the PVO [air defense system] of the CIS. In 
this way, the republic falls under Russia's powerful 'umbrella'. The existence of 
this 'umbrella', as many in Baku believe, can stiffen Yerevan's resolve in the 
negotiations over Nagorno-Karabakh, where in the event of renewed hostilities 
the military balance would not be in Azerbaijan's favor." Moreover, Western 
investors, Mal'gin argues, must worry about the proximity of Nagorno-Karabakh 
to the export route: Wouldn't they be scared off by a new upsurge in the fighting? 
 
This rather blatant threat comes from a person who teaches Russia's future 
foreign policy practitioners and a journal aimed at its current policy makers. 
Interestingly, it contains no mention of the legal status of the Caspian, or of a 
legality of any kind. 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
TAJIKISTAN 
Opposition threatening to withdraw from NRC for second time 
The United Tajik Opposition (UTO) is threatening to withdraw its representatives 
from the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) for the second time since 
the June 1997 signing of the inter-Tajik peace agreement, unless President 
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Rahmonov and his administration agree to the immediate fulfillment of a number 
of conditions. These conditions include: the release of 93 opposition troops from 
prison, in accordance with the amnesty law which President Rahmonov finally 
agreed to put into effect earlier in the month; the granting of full legal status to the 
opposition parties and organizations which constitute the UTO; removal of 
restrictions on the opposition media, which were officially prohibited in 1993 by 
Tajikistan's Supreme Court; the transfer to UTO members of their full 30 percent 
share in the country's executive and legislative bodies, both at the national and 
local level; 30 percent representation in Tajikistan's foreign diplomatic missions 
and in the banking sector by the opposition; and the approval of the UTO's 
nominee for the post of defense minister, Mirzo Ziyo. The deadline for these 
demands to be met is mid-July. The opposition leadership would also like to see 
parliamentary elections held prior to the presidential elections, contrary to 
President Rahmonov's proposal. (ITAR-TASS WORLD SERVICE, 1236 GMT, 24 
May 99; BBC Worldwide Monitoring/nexis, and RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 25 May 99) 
 
Said Abdullo Nuri, the chairman of both the UTO and NRC, had already 
published a number of these demands in an open letter to UN Special Envoy to 
Tajikistan Jan Kubis approximately three weeks ago, when the peace process 
stalled over President Rahmonov's refusal to approve the NRC's proposed 
constitutional amendments. At a news conference following his return to 
Dushanbe from Iran (where he had been receiving medical treatment), Nuri 
explained the reasons behind the UTO leaders' decision to withdraw their 
representatives from the NRC if their demands are not soon met. He stated that 
the NRC would not be able to complete its remaining tasks until the president 
and his administration agree to meet the UTO's demands (most of which are 
stipulated by the political protocol) and therefore it would be futile for the 
opposition representatives to attend any further NRC meetings. He added that 
the government's reluctance to implement the terms of the political protocol was 
causing considerable dissatisfaction among UTO members, as well as creating a 
serious obstacle to any further progress in the peace process. (VOICE OF THE 
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ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, 1600 GMT, 21 May 99; BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring/nexis) 
 
President Rahmonov has assured everyone that he firmly intends to hold new 
presidential elections by the time his own term of office ends and that new 
parliamentary elections will then follow. However, he seems to have forgotten 
that, unless the opposition parties which make up the UTO are legalized with 
ample time to organize political campaigns, the next presidential and 
parliamentary elections will be as meaningless as the last ones were. It is not 
surprising that President Rahmonov is less than willing to create conditions for 
free and fair elections; however, it is surprising that he has chosen to flout the 
terms of the peace agreement so openly. It is also worth noting that although 
spokespersons from the EU, the UN, the United States and Iran have urged the 
Tajik president to accelerate the rate of the peace process by complying with the 
political protocol, the Russian government has so far remained silent. Russia 
recently signed a military cooperation agreement with Tajikistan which grants the 
Russian government an even greater degree of influence over Tajikistan's affairs 
than in the past. The agreement also reaffirmed Russia's support for Tajikistan's 
current regime. As a result, President Rahmonov may now feel confident enough 
to ignore international pressure and adhere to his own agenda, which is unlikely 
to include ceding power to members of the opposition. 
 
Over 1,000 UTO troops now working for Russian border guard 
According to Major-General Mahmudbek Ahmedov, more than 1,000 troops from 
the Tajik opposition forces have been integrated into Tajikistan's State Border 
Protection Committee and now assist in patrolling the Ishkoshim, Murghob, Panj 
and Qala-i Khum sections of Tajikistan's border with Afghanistan and China. 
Former UTO troops are also stationed along the Tajik-Uzbek and Tajik-Kyrgyz 
border. Although the State Border Protection Committee is a Tajik entity, it is 
operationally subordinate to the Russian Federal Border Service command 
stationed in Tajikistan. Russian troops guard Tajikistan's "external" borders and 
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supervise the activities of the Tajik State Border Protection units which operate 
there. Tajikistan's "internal" borders are guarded only by native forces, which now 
consist of approximately 9,000 men. (ITAR-TASS WORLD SERVICE, 0534 
GMT, 4 May 99; The British Broadcasting Corporation/nexis) 
 
These appear to be the only UTO troops which have thus far been fully 
integrated into Tajikistan's national armed services. By assigning the UTO troops 
to border guard units, the Tajik government accomplishes a number of aims. 
Firstly, the opposition fighters are kept well away from President Rahmonov's 
center of power in Dushanbe, which has shown itself to be quite vulnerable to 
attacks from discontented militia leaders. Border guard duty is also a fairly 
difficult and dangerous task, which frequently involves shoot-outs with groups of 
smugglers from Afghanistan. The UTO units, seasoned as they are, will no doubt 
have their hands full trying to curb the narcotics and weapons trade. Their 
proximity to the smuggling trade also provides an opportunity for Tajik 
government officials and Russian border guard commanders to use them as 
scapegoats in the corruption scandals which occasionally surface in the Tajik 
government. Finally, the Tajik government has managed to assign ultimate 
responsibility for the former UTO troops' conduct to the Russian border guard 
command, instead of to Tajik military leaders. Thus, none of Tajikistan's 
government or military officials will have to answer for the former UTO fighters' 
shortcomings. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Kate Martin 
 
ESTONIA 
Activities of special ops leader focus attention on group's lack of oversight 
While President Lennart Meri would not accept Defense Forces Commander Lt. 
Gen. Johannes Kert's resignation over the issue, charges of criminal activity by 
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the leader of the forces' Special Operations Group will likely continue to have 
reverberations. An ad hoc commission examining the group cited a discrepancy 
between the actual and legal chain of command of the unit, and suggested that 
there had been violations of various regulations by members. (RFE/RL 
NEWSLINE, 2 Jun 99) According to police, Sgt. Indrek Holm, the acting head of 
the Special Operations Group, has been pursuing extracurricular activity that 
clearly conflicts with his job. In mid-May Holm was shot in the shoulder and the 
head when he and his accomplices attempted to rob three men near the village 
of Kaberneeme, police said, in an operation that bears similarities to a robbery 
that occurred in January east of Tallinn in which a cash collector was killed. In 
both robberies, three perpetrators, wearing dark clothing and black masks, first 
clubbed a security guard and then attacked the driver, according to Baltic News 
Service, and the same caliber gun was used both times. (Baltic News Service 
DAILY REPORT, 1000 GMT, 18 May 99) Holm reportedly used his service 
weapon, a Glock pistol, in the May attack. The Special Operations Group he 
commands is officially subordinated to the defense forces' guards battalion and 
military police. 
 
Don't let the door hit you ... 
President Lennart Meri, clearly indicating that enough is enough, has suggested 
other uses for the funds of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) than its current mission in Tallinn. "... I think the OSCE Mission 
should be, not wound up, but reorganized so that it would also in the future help 
our state overcome the Soviet past," Meri said, suggesting that perhaps a 
research center, or an academic chair at Tartu University, could be considered. 
(Baltic News Service DAILY REPORT, 1000 GMT, 7 May 99) 
 
OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities Max van der Stoel continues to 
pepper the government with recommendations about amendments to its laws on 
elections and language. The election law will require fluency in the Estonian 
language for members of parliament and local self-government councils. The 
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language law amendment mandates the use of the Estonian language in the 
private sphere as well. According to Prime Minister Mart Laar, the government 
has higher priorities than discussing Stoel's memorandum. "It is nice for Estonia 
to have such an active adviser who sends us letters of different contents, which 
we here read with great interest," he added. (Baltic News Service DAILY 
REPORT, 1600 GMT, 6 May 99) One of Laar's higher priorities was taking the 
visiting president of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Lord Russell-
Johnston, on a tour of the northeastern region of the country, where the 
population is predominantly Russian-speaking. The visit seemed to pay off, since 
Russell-Johnston announced he heard no complaints of discrimination during his 
visit. He also took the opportunity to support vocally the much-discussed 
language law. "I'm not an expert in this field, but Estonian is the official language 
in Estonia and I don't see any reason why people here shouldn't be able to speak 
it," he remarked at Concordia University in Tallinn. (Baltic News Service DAILY 
REPORT, 1300 GMT, 12 May 99) 
 
Another group quickly becoming organization non grata is the Council of Baltic 
Sea States (CBSS). The council's commissioner, Ole Espersen, often has 
echoed allegations emanating from Russia that there are human rights violations 
occurring in Estonia. Continuing the new tactic of Estonian officials to stop 
accepting free unsolicited advice on the country's legislation, Foreign Minister 
Toomas Hendrik Ilves said the CBSS is addressing matters outside its purview. 
"The Council of the Baltic Sea States should concentrate on solving economic 
problems," Ilves said. "...Estonia's official position is that the mandate of [Council 
Commissioner] Ole Espersen is fulfilled. (Baltic News Service DAILY REPORT, 
1000 GMT, 17 May 99) 
 
LATVIA 
Political typhoon rocks ship of state 
A political crisis nearly swamped Prime Minister Vilis Kristopans last month, and, 
while he survived a vote of no confidence in parliament, the storm may not have 
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passed yet. The catalyst for the crisis was at times quite vocal dissension, claims 
and counterclaims between the government and one of its members, Economics 
Minister Ainars Slesers. Slesers charged that entrepreneur and Ventspils Mayor 
Aivars Lembergs held too much sway over the Kristopans government. Slesers 
also said that Lembergs had named himself a state trustee in the Latvian energy 
company Latvenergo, and in reaction to Slesers' accusations of possible conflict 
of interest, brought pressure to bear on the ministry and the government. (Baltic 
News Service DAILY REPORT, 1800 GMT, 10 May 99) Slesers, a member of 
the New Party, indeed was forced from his position after he failed to take 
advantage of the opportunity to resign voluntarily. He claims the dismissal was 
due to his unwillingness to heed "the dictate by sponsors." (Baltic News Service 
DAILY REPORT, 1800 GMT, 10 May 99) Much more likely a motivating force is 
Kristopans' oft-stated refusal to deal with vocal opposition from within his 
government. 
 
However, rumors had begun to swirl earlier in the month, with reports from the 
Kristopans camp that the opposition was attempting to destabilize the 
government. Intimations of increasing instability were verified by members of the 
government and of the opposition, which hinted that defections from the 
government coalition could lead to Kristopans' overthrow. (Baltic News Service 
DAILY REPORT, 1800 GMT, 6 May 99) Opposition People's Party spokesman 
Gundars Berzins said his faction was waiting for action by members of the 
coalition, specifically the New Party, to initiate a vote of no confidence. "This is a 
decisive moment in the fate of the New Party and the government's survival is in 
the New Party's hands," Berzins said. (Baltic News Service DAILY REPORT, 
1600 GMT, 10 May 99) In the end it was Skele's People's Party that filed the 
motion to hold a vote of no confidence in the parliament against Kristopans. 
While Kristopans claimed the move was political, and Lembergs charged Skele 
with fomenting instability in the government to further his own business interests 
(Baltic News Service DAILY REPORT, 1300 GMT, 12 May 99), the real catalyst 
most probably is a combination of the two. Still smarting from earlier scandals 
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that virtually ensure he won't lead a Latvian government despite the continued 
popularity of his People's Party, Skele has not hesitated to voice his disapproval 
of the incumbent PM. Moreover, given the current discussions concerning 
privatization, the government needs to appear balanced in its dealings with all 
economic interests that are eager to participate in the process. In the end, the 
New Party remained with the coalition government. The motion of no confidence 
failed to pass with 24 votes for, 60 against, and 14 abstention. (Baltic News 
Service DAILY REPORT, 1000 GMT, 20 May 99) 
 
LITHUANIA 
Government instability ends in new leadership 
While dissent within the government coalition was not sufficient to topple Latvia's 
government, discord between the prime minister and president in Lithuania (see 
The NIS Observed, 19 May 99) did manage to bring in new leadership. Although 
the Conservative Party political council at first promised not to accept any 
nomination for PM to replace member Gediminas Vagnorius, the tune changed 
when President Valdas Adamkus began discussions with Rolandas Paksas, 
mayor of Vilnius. Thus, on 5 May the political council announced that "the 
president should not nominate and appoint a Conservative party member to the 
prime minister's post." (Baltic News Service DAILY REPORT, 1600 GMT, 5 May 
99) Less than one week later, Conservative faction spokesman Arvydas 
Vidziunas announced a reversal: "If a member of the Conservative Party accepts 
at his own free will the presidential trust and the proposal to become a candidate 
to the prime ministerial post, the parliamentary Conservative faction will not 
mind." (Baltic News Service DAILY REPORT, 1000 GMT, 11 May 99) Paksas, 
who public opinion polls name as the most popular figure in the Conservative 
Party, obtained a clear signal of support from parliament: The Seimas vote on his 
appointment was 105 in favor, 1 against, with 12 abstentions. (Baltic News 
Service DAILY REPORT, 1800 GMT, 18 May 99) Paksas' years as mayor of 
Vilnius, overseeing the often-contentious City Council, should serve as valuable 
experience as he heads the new government. He also approaches his new 
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position with at least a verbal guarantee that the storm which sank his 
predecessor's government will not unseat him: At a meeting of Adamkus, 
Landsbergis and Paksas, it was agreed that the new premier alone will select 
ministerial candidates. (Baltic News Service DAILY REPORT, 1600 GMT, 12 
May 99) Tensions between Vagnorius and Adamkus had heightened over 
charges that the president was interfering overmuch in the government's work. 
Paksas presented his Cabinet -- only half of which is comprised of ministers from 
the Vagnorius government -- to parliament for approval on 1 June. 
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